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Abstract
Recent rapid technological and medical advance has more than ever before brought to the fore a spectrum
of problems broadly categorized under the umbrella of ‘ethics of human enhancement’. Some of the most
contentious issues are typified well by the arguments put forward in a recent article on human cognitive
enhancement authored by Garasic and Lavazza. Herein I analyse some of the assumptions made in their work
and highlight important flaws. In particular I address the problems associated with the distinction between
‘treatment’ and ‘enhancement’, and ‘natural’ vs. ‘non-natural’ therapies.
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It is with much interest that I read the article entitled
“Moral and social reasons to acknowledge the use of
cognitive enhancers in competitive-selective contexts”
authored by Garasic and Lavazza, and recently published
in BMC Medical Ethics [1]. The topic addressed in the
aforementioned article is highly relevant and intellec-
tually interesting, so I very much welcome all contribu-
tions to the surrounding debate. Moreover I found the
authors’ thoughts and arguments insightful, and am in
agreement with many of their conclusions.
Having said the above, I am compelled to highlight a
number of important premises underlying the arguments
of Garasic and Lavazza, which though appealing at first
sight fail to withstand deeper scrutiny. For the sake of
succinctness I will focus on a few which I find to be the
most pervasive in the existing literature, or which I
consider to be of greatest conceptual importance for
the correct framing of the discussion.
Enhancement vs. treatment I would like to begin with
the distinction that Garasic and Lavazza attempt to draw
between the use of various means to achieve an en-
hancement of a human ability (in this case the authors
are specifically interested in cognitive abilities but the
nature of the argument remains unaltered even if this
constraint is abandoned) as opposed to what is usually
termed as a treatment. The former is supposed to be
understood as effecting an improvement to an ability
initially functioning within the suitable normal range,
or to quote Garasic and Lavazza (remembering that
their focus is on pharmaceutical agents and cognitive
performance):
“The substances most commonly included in the
set of PCE are drugs used off-label by healthy
people who do not have specific deficits but want
to improve their standards of intellectual and
cognitive performance…”,
whereas the latter is taken to be a remedy for sub-
normal functioning (or indeed, a full loss of a specific
function) thereby treating what can be considered an
abnormality (e.g. a disability, disfunction, or disorder).
The same distinction has been made previously by a
number of scholars [2–4], and though it may appeal to
our intuitive sensibilities I believe that a more rigorous
consideration and analysis of the distinction, made by
several authors in the past [5, 6], reveals its lack of a
solid underpinning principle.
Humans exhibit variation in nearly if not literally every
characteristic worthy of consideration as well as perhaps
more pertinently, in the potential for the development of
a particular characteristic, be it height [7], muscular
strength [8], memory [9], sense of spatial orientation
[10], general intelligence [11], or any one of a plethora
of other possible examples. What range within this
spectrum we deem as normal is in principle arbitrary {
individuals (in this case human but also more generally
of any life form) with a well adapted or poorly adapted
particular characteristic are expected to be found in
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nature, as the theory of natural selection would predict.
There is no fundamental reason why any of them would
be considered ‘abnormal’ or ‘not normal’. They may be
desirable or undesirable, from the point of the view of
the individual himself, another individual, or (more
contentiously) even the society, but the realm of these
descriptions is different from that occupied by claims
of ‘normality’ or lack thereof.
Even if we accept a certain delineation between normal
and sub-normal, it is not at all clear when treatment
would become enhancement. Should ‘treatment’ merely
take a certain function to the lowest end of the ‘normal’
range? Why or why not instead the mean of the ‘normal’
range or indeed its upper limit? Why would the use of
a certain agent not be considered as enhancement if
the person’s characteristic of interest is marginally sub-
normal but as enhancement if the person is marginally
above the sub-normal limit? What moral principle im-
pels us to treat a climb on the ladder of competitive-
ness (recall that the authors’ focus is on competitive
contexts) of the former individual differently than that
of the latter?
The aforementioned variation in human characteris-
tics, of course, also exhibits temporal variation [9, 12].
It is not in the least surprising that, for example, as a
person ages there is an associated deterioration in a
number of physical and mental functions. Should the
boundaries of ‘normal’ thus vary accordingly? Does that
for example mean that the hormone replacement therapy
(HRT) administered to a menopausal woman would fall
under the umbrella of ‘enhancement’ even if it results
in higher quality of life?
In brief, the authors’ argument is in effect underlain by
an essentialist view whereby there is some idealized ‘nor-
mally functioning’ human. However this stance does not
fit well our scientific understanding of the biological
reality, the genotypic and phenotypic diversity funda-
mental to the principle of natural selection, or indeed
ethical principles.
Natural vs. non-natural Another distinction that the
authors attempt to make early in their article is that of
‘natural’ and ‘non-natural’ enhancements1:
“It seems reasonable to stress that there are
substantial differences between the natural enhancers
we just mentioned and the newer ones…”
The authors do not explain clearly what they mean by
‘natural’ in this context. Presumably what they refer to
are substances which occur in nature without human
intervention (their examples of caffeine, nicotine, and
khat, support this interpretation). Even if we accept this
understanding of the term ‘natural’ and neglect the
observation that these ‘natural’ substances are often sold
and consumed in concentrations and forms very much
unlike those found in nature (e.g. caffeine is readily
bought as 99.9 % pure powder [13]), as well as con-
sumed in a fashion which their natural forms would not
readily allow (e.g. transdermally [14] or using nasal
sprays [15]), I fail to see how this definition is morally
relevant. Indeed the authors seem to be obliquely aware
of this as suggested by their attempt to elaborate the
issue using a non sequitur whereby the focus is shifted
to the magnitude of effect:
“…in other words, the ‘peak’ of the performance
is not comparable to that sought through the use
of methylphenidate and Modafinil, for instance
[15{17].”
Notwithstanding the examples given there is no funda-
mental reason why a ‘natural’ substance would not have
a substantial effect. If effectiveness is indeed what the
authors are interested in, surely it is in fact not reason-
able to make a distinction between agents based on
whether or not they are ‘natural’ but rather based on
their inherent properties. However if this approach is
adopted similar problems to those highlighted previously
in “Enhancement vs. treatment” arise.
Continuing with an attempt to exclude some agents
from their consideration the authors shortly thereafter
make another shift in their position summarized by the
following:
“The substances that are currently most widely used
(and deemed to be the most effective) are those
marketed for the treatment of neurodegenerative
disorders, ADHD and narcolepsy [38{40]. Thus,
caffeine and nicotine, as well as other forms of
enhancement, are excluded from the domain of
PCE.”
The reasoning in this excerpt is oddly singular. The
authors seem to shift their position from the consider-
ation of whether specific agents (in this case caffeine
and nicotine) are found in nature or how effective they
are, to how they are marketed. Even more so than in
the previous cases it is difficult to see what relevance in
the context of the present discussion the authors find
in this.
Lastly, though I will not elaborate on this point,
given the nature of Garasic and Lavazza’s article I
consider their unquestioned and unqualified adoption
of the term ‘abuse’ (in “…Federal Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration affirms that
roughly 137,000 American college students start abus-
ing prescription stimulants each year.”) an unfortunate
oversight.
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We would like to thank Arandjelović for having engaged
with our article and having praised some of its content.
Here we will try to reply to some of the concerns raised
by him hoping to clarify further some of the aspects
deemed unclear.
Enhancement vs. treatment
Regarding the often discussed issue of enhancement vs.
treatment, we agree that there is no “ontological” divide
between normality and abnormality, and that “humans
exhibit variation in nearly if not literally every character-
istic worthy of consideration”. However, in our opinion,
this shareable observation is not enough to completely
invalidate this distinction, which can be drawn from
objective data and involves a conventional and/or nor-
mative component. Take, for example, the main neuro-
psychological tests used for cognitive and specifically
executive functions. These tests, which have been stan-
dardized and validated by the scientific community well
before the debate on enhancement, assume that there is
some degree of variability in cognitive performance, but
also set the minimum thresholds, under which it is
agreed, and not arbitrarily, that the subject has a deficit.
If this is the case, it is understood that the subject can-
not perform adequately - or safely for herself and for
others - certain tasks requiring cognitive and executive
abilities at a higher level than the established minimum.
For instance, if someone lacks sufficient attention and
reflexes, they cannot be given a driving license, and an
intervention, pharmacological or otherwise, to restore
sufficient testable levels should be considered a treat-
ment. In contrast, if a subject falls within the normal
range and, hoping to become a Formula 1 driver, takes
massive doses of Ritalin, then this is enhancement. Of
course, there may be more nuanced situations, and the
enhancement vs. treatment question can never be settled
for good. Still, the distinction is valid and can be useful.
It obviously is not absolute, nor is it solely based on “our
scientific understanding of the biological reality,” but it
can still be used to ground a thought out moral evalu-
ation and a pondered practical application in social and
political choices.
A very interesting aspect, which we have not dealt with
as it lies outside the scope of our article, is the question
raised by Arandjielović about temporal variations in
human characteristics. How to evaluate interventions on
older people, who are facing a progressive physiological
deterioration of their cognitive skills? When, hopefully
soon, it will become possible to treat Alzheimer’s pa-
tients who, in the advanced stage of the disease, have
lost almost all of their memory, will this be considered
a treatment? And what about restoring the memory of
a healthy nonagenarian to levels typical of a forty-year-
old? Will that be considered enhancement? Deciding
whether this distinction makes sense and can be drawn
will obviously have strong practical implications, linked,
for example, to the interventions that public health
systems will be required to provide, for free or charged
to the patient.
Natural and non-natural
Arandjelović is correct in underlining that we did not
fully specify the meaning of natural, so we will take this
occasion to expand on this point.
We are aware that the definition of ‘natural’ -or
normal- 2 can easily become controversial and whatever
the limits one assesses to be appropriate, they can be
questioned. Yet, we opted for the use of one distinction.
The commentator suggests synthetic as a possible alter-
native to define all the substances not considered natural
-giving relevance to the fact of those being created in a
laboratory. Even if we do not use the term directly in our
article, the natural/synthetic distinction holds –albeit it
does encapsulate all the meaning of our definition.
To clarify better –and address another concern of
Arandjelović- we must point out that the definition is
morally relevant for the importance it conveys to the
accessibility that a given substance has in a given society
-exemplifying at the same time the ‘historical roots’ of a
certain (cognitive) enhancer -with the resulting accept-
ance and distribution (the use and problems associated
with Khat is linked to this for instance), as well as a
gradual biological adaptation of our body to the effects
of the substance.
In line with the ideology at the core of human en-
hancement (to which supporters of “more effective”
cognitive enhancers refer to more or less directly), one
of the objectives of any enhancement is to jump as
many as possible of the ‘natural phases’ of development
occurred in the course of human evolution. So, even if
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caffeine is consumed as a result of an “artificial” process
not present in nature, the characteristics of the sub-
stance itself have not been modified much. In addition,
the cultural development of having implemented coffee
in our lives might be ascribable also to its taste, not
only the way it affects our performances (the same
could be said for cacao in relation to our emotional
cravings for instance). On the other hand, amphetamines
of various kinds have been created in laboratories with
the only intention of amplifying our concentration,
focus, resistance to tiredness and so on. That is what, in
our account, makes a difference. And the relevance of
such a distinction is exemplified by the stronger effects
that all the PCE defined by us as non-natural have.
As for the “unfortunate oversight” of having used the
term ‘abuse’ in relation to the use of PCE by college
students not in need of such prescription drugs, we
might concede that ‘misuse’ might be a slightly more
neutral term –though ‘abuse’ remains obviously more
directly linked to the very authority we cite the data from.
Endnotes
1Though it is reasonable to assume that the authors
are trying to contrast ‘natural’ with ‘synthetic’ since they
do not actually use the latter term explicitly (nor any
other in its place), in an e ort to avoid the perception of
making a straw man argument I use the adjective ‘non-
natural’ as an ipso facto class that includes all agents
which are not ‘natural’ and only those.
2Though in a different context, one of us wrote on
the role of normalcy (and its interaction with societal
values) in another venue [16].
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